to what extent did the abbasids build the umayyad traditions

Overthrow of the Umayyad Caliphate past the Abbasids in 750

Abbasid Revolution
Date 9 June 747 – July 750 Location Greater Khorasan and present day Iran and Iraq Result Abbasid victory Abbasid cribbing of most former Umayyad territory Eventual establishment of the Emirate of Córdoba Terminate of privileged status for Arabs Cease of official bigotry against non-Arabs
Belligerents
Abbasid Caliphate Support Shia Muslims[i] Non-Arab Sunni Muslims	Umayyad Caliphate Support Tribal Sunni Arabs
Commanders and leaders
As-Saffah Al-Mansur Abu Muslim Qahtaba ibn Shabib al-Ta'i † Al-Hasan ibn Qahtaba Abdallah ibn Ali	Marwan II Nasr ibn Sayyar † Yazid ibn Umar Ma'northward ibn Za'ida al-Shaybani

The Abbasid Revolution, also called the Movement of the Men of the Black Raiment,^[ii] was the overthrow of the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE), the 2d of the four major Caliphates in early Islamic history, by the third, the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1517 CE). Coming to power three decades after the death of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and immediately after the Rashidun Caliphate, the Umayyads were an Arab empire ruling over a population which was overwhelmingly non-Arab. Non-Arabs were treated as second-form citizens regardless of whether or not they converted to Islam, and this discontent cutting across faiths and ethnicities ultimately led to the Umayyads' overthrow.^[three] The Abbasid family unit claimed to accept descended from al-Abbas, an uncle of Muhammad.

The revolution essentially marked the cease of the Arab empire and the beginning of a more than inclusive, multiethnic land in the Center East.^[4] Remembered as one of the most well-organized revolutions during its period in history, it reoriented the focus of the Muslim world to the east.^[five]

Background [edit]

By the 740s, the Umayyad Empire plant itself in critical status. A dispute over succession in 744 led to the Third Muslim Civil State of war, which raged across the Middle East for 2 years. The very adjacent twelvemonth, al-Dahhak ibn Qays al-Shaybani initiated a Kharijite rebellion that would continue until 746. Concurrent with this, a rebellion bankrupt out in reaction to Marwan II'south conclusion to move the capital letter from Damascus to Harran, resulting in the destruction of Homs – also in 746. It was not until 747 that Marwan II was able to pacify the provinces; the Abbasid Revolution began inside months.^[6]

Nasr ibn Sayyar was appointed governor of Khurusan by Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik in 738. He held on to his post throughout the ceremonious war, being confirmed every bit governor by Marwan II in the aftermath.^[6]

Khurusan's expansive size and low population density meant that the Arab citizenry – both military and civilian – lived largely exterior of the garrisons built during the spread of Islam. This was in contrast to the rest of the Umayyad provinces, where Arabs tended to beleaguer themselves in fortresses and avoided interaction with the locals.^[vii] Arab settlers in Khorasan left their traditional lifestyle and settled amid the native Iranian peoples.^[6] While intermarriage with non-Arabs elsewhere in the Empire was discouraged or even banned,^{[8] [9]} it slowly became a habit inside eastern Khorasan; and the Arabs began adopting Persian clothes and as the 2 languages influenced one another, the ethnic barriers came down.^[x]

Causes [edit]

Support for the Abbasid Revolution came from people of diverse backgrounds, with about all levels of society supporting armed opposition to Umayyad dominion.^[11] This was peculiarly pronounced amidst Muslims of not-Arab descent,^{[12] [xiii] [14]} though fifty-fifty Arab Muslims resented Umayyad rule and centralized authority over their nomadic lifestyles.^{[13] [15]} Both Sunnis and Shias supported efforts to overthrow the Umayyads,^{[eleven] [12] [14] [16] [17]} equally did non-Muslim subjects of the empire who resented religious discrimination.^[18]

Discontent among Shia Muslims [edit]

Remnants of Qasr Amra, a desert palace where Umayyad princes were notorious for indulgence and extravagance^[19]

Following the Boxing of Karbala which led to the massacre of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad, and his kin and companions by the Umayyad regular army in 680 CE, the Shias used this event as a rallying cry of opposition against the Umayyads. The Abbasids also used the memory of Karbala extensively to proceeds popular support against the Umayyads.^[20]

The Hashimiyya movement (a sub-sect of the Kaysanites Shia) were largely responsible for starting the concluding efforts against the Umayyad dynasty,^[6] initially with the goal of replacing the Umayyads with an Alid ruling family.^{[21] [22]} To an extent, rebellion against the Umayyads bore an early association with Shi'ite ideas.^{[xv] [23]} A number of Shi'ite revolts against Umayyad rule had already taken place, though they were open most their want for an Alid ruler. Zayd ibn Ali fought the Umayyads in Iraq, while Abdallah ibn Mu'awiya even established temporary dominion over Persia. Their murder non only increased anti-Umayyad sentiment amongst the Shia, but as well gave both Shias and Sunnis in Iraq and Persia a common rallying cry.^[17] At the same fourth dimension, the capture and murder of the chief Shi'ite opposition figures rendered the Abbasids as the just realistic contenders for the void that would exist left by the Umayyads.^[24]

The Abbasids kept serenity about their identity, simply stating that they wanted a ruler from the descendant of Muhammad upon whose choice equally caliph the Muslim community would agree.^{[25] [26]} Many Shi'ites naturally assumed that this meant an Alid ruler, a belief which the Abbasids tacitly encouraged to gain Shi'ite support.^[27] Though the Abbasids were members of the Banu Hashim clan, rivals of the Umayyads, the give-and-take "Hashimiyya" seems to refer specifically to Abd-Allah ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, a grandson of Ali and son of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah.^{[ commendation needed ]}

According to certain traditions, Abd-Allah died in 717 in Humeima in the house of Mohammad ibn Ali Abbasi, the head of the Abbasid family unit, and before dying named Muhammad ibn Ali as his successor.^[28] Although the anecdote is considered a fabrication,^[24] at the time it allowed the Abbasids to rally the supporters of the failed revolt of Mukhtar al-Thaqafi, who had represented themselves as the supporters of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya. By the time the revolution was in full swing, most Kaysanite Shia had either transferred their allegiance to the Abbasid dynasty (in the case of the Hashimiyya),^{[29] [30]} or had converted to other branches of Shi'ism and the Kaysanites ceased to exist.^[31]

Discontent among Sunni Muslims who were non-Arab [edit]

The Umayyad country is remembered equally an Arab-axial state, being run by and for the do good of those who were ethnically Arab though Muslim in creed.^{[13] [32]} The non-Arab Muslims resented their marginal social position and were easily drawn into Abbasid opposition to Umayyad dominion.^{[15] [sixteen] [28]} Arabs dominated the hierarchy and military, and were housed in fortresses divide from the local population outside of Arabia.^[7] Even later on converting to Islam, not-Arabs or Mawali could not live in these garrison cities. The not-Arabs were not allowed to piece of work for the government nor could they hold officer positions in the Umayyad military and they still had to pay the jizya tax for non-Muslims.^{[32] [33] [34] [35]} Non-Muslims under Umayyad dominion were subject to these aforementioned injunctions.^[36] Racial intermarriage between Arabs and non Arabs was rare.^[8] When information technology did occur, it was just immune between an Arab homo and a not-Arab adult female while non-Arab men were generally non costless to marry Arab women.^[9]

Conversion to Islam occurred gradually. If a not-Arab wished to convert to Islam, they not merely had to give up their own names but likewise had to remain a second-class citizen.^{[14] [34]} The not-Arab would be "adopted" by an Arab tribe,^[35] though they would not actually adopt the tribe'southward proper name equally that would risk pollution of perceived Arab racial purity. Rather, the non-Arab would accept the terminal proper name of "freedman of al-(tribe's name)", even if they were not a slave prior to conversion. This essentially meant they were subservient to the tribe who sponsored their conversion.^{[14] [37]}

Although converts to Islam fabricated up roughly 10% of the native population – well-nigh of the people living under Umayyad rule were not Muslim – this percentage was pregnant due to the very pocket-sized number of Arabs.^[thirteen] Gradually, the non-Arab Muslims outnumbered the Arab Muslims, causing alarm among the Arab nobility.^[32] Socially, this posed a trouble every bit the Umayyads viewed Islam every bit the property of the aloof Arab families.^{[38] [39]} In that location was a rather large financial problem posed to the Umayyad organisation also. If the new converts to Islam from non-Arab peoples stopped paying the jizya tax stipulated by the Qur'an for non-Muslims, the empire would go bankrupt. This lack of civil and political rights eventually led the not-Arab Muslims to back up the Abbasids, despite the latter also being Arab.^[forty]

Even as the Arab governors adopted the more sophisticated Iranian methods of governmental assistants, non-Arabs were nonetheless prevented from holding such positions.^[eight] Non-Arabs were not even allowed to wear Arabian manner vesture,^[41] so potent were the feelings of Arab racial superiority cultivated by the Umayyads. Much of the discontent this acquired led to the Shu'ubiyya move, an exclamation of non-Arab racial and cultural equality with Arabs. The movement gained support among Egyptians, Arameans and Berber people,^[42] though this movement was most pronounced among Iranian people.^{[ commendation needed ]}

Repression of Iranian civilisation [edit]

The early Muslim conquest of Persia was coupled with an anti-Iranian Arabization policy which led to much discontent.^[43] The controversial Umayyad governor Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf was upset at the usage of Western farsi equally the court language in the eastern Islamic empire, and ordered all written and spoken Farsi to be suppressed in both government and even among the general public, by force if necessary.^{[44] [45]} Contemporary historians record that al-Hajjaj contributed to the decease of the Khwarezmian language, closely related to Persian. Once the Umayyads expanded into Khwarezm, a stronghold of east Iranian civilisation, al-Hajjaj ordered the execution of anyone who could read or write the language, to the betoken that merely the illiterate remained.^[46]

Discontent among non-Muslims [edit]

Back up for the Abbasid Revolution was an early example of people of unlike faiths aligning with a common cause. This was due in large part to policies of the Umayyads which were regarded equally peculiarly oppressive to anyone following a faith other than Islam. In 741, the Umayyads decreed that non-Muslims could not serve in regime posts.^[47] The Abbasids were enlightened of this discontent, and made efforts to balance both its Muslim character every bit well every bit its partially non-Muslim constituency.^[48]

Persecution of Zoroastrians was part of state policy during the Umayyad era. Al-Hajjaj allegedly killed all Zoroastrian clergy upon the conquest of east Iranian lands, burning all Zoroastrian literature and destroying most religious buildings.^[46] The non-Muslim aristocracy around Merv supported the Abbasids, and thus retained their status as a privileged governing course regardless of religious conventionalities.^[15]

Events [edit]

Buildup [edit]

Beginning around 719, Hashimiyya missions began to seek adherents in Khurasan. Their campaign was framed as one of proselytism. They sought support for "a member of the House of the Prophet who shall exist pleasing to everyone",^[49] without making explicit mention of the Abbasids.^{[27] [50]} These missions met with success both among Arabs and not-Arabs, although the latter may have played a particularly important role in the growth of the movement. A number of Shi'ite rebellions – by Kaysanites, Hashimiyya and mainstream Shi'ites – took place in the final years of Umayyad rule, just around the aforementioned time that tempers were flaring among the Syrian contingents of the Umayyad army regarding alliances and wrongdoings during the 2nd^{[34] [51]} and Third Fitna.^[52]

At this time Kufa was the center for the opposition to Umayyad dominion, particularly Ali'south supporters and Shias. In 741–42 Abu Muslim made his beginning contact with Abbasid agents there, and eventually he was introduced to the head of Abbasids, Imam Ibrahim, in Mecca. Around 746, Abu Muslim assumed leadership of the Hashimiyya in Khurasan.^[53] Unlike the Alid revolts which were open and straightforward virtually their demands, the Abbasids forth with the Hashimite allies slowly built up an underground resistance movement to Umayyad dominion. Secret networks were used to build a ability base of support in the eastern Muslim lands to ensure the revolution's success.^{[23] [51]} This buildup non only took place correct on the heels of the Zaydi Defection in Republic of iraq, but also concurrently with the Berber Defection in Iberia and Maghreb, the Ibadi rebellion in Yemen and Hijaz,^[54] and the Third Fitna in the Levant, with the defection of al-Harith ibn Surayj in Khurasan and Central Asia occurring concurrently with the revolution itself.^{[thirteen] [14]} The Abbasids spent their grooming time watching as the Umayyad Empire was besieged from within itself in all four key directions,^[55] and Schoolhouse of Oriental and African Studies Professor Emeritus Chiliad. R. Hawting has asserted that even if the Umayyad rulers had been enlightened of the Abbasids' preparations, it would not have been possible to mobilize against them.^[6]

Revolt of Ibn Surayj [edit]

In 746, Ibn Surayj began his defection at Merv without success at showtime, even losing his secretarial assistant Jahm bin Safwan.^[56] Afterward joining forces with other rebel factions, Ibn Surayj drove Umayyad governor Nasr ibn Sayyar and his forces to Nishapur; the ii factions double-crossed each other shortly thereafter, with Ibn Surayj's faction being crushed. Western Khorasan was controlled past Abdallah ibn Mu'awiya at the time, cutting Ibn Sayyar in the east off from Marwan II. In the summertime of 747, Ibn Sayyar sued for peace, which was accepted by the remaining rebels. The insubordinate leader was assassinated by a son of Ibn Surayj in a revenge assault while at the same time, another Shi'ite revolt had begun in the villages. The son of the remaining rebels signed the peace accord and Ibn Sayyar returned to his post in Merv in August of 747^[56] – just subsequently Abu Muslim initiated a revolt of his own.

Khorasan phase [edit]

On ix June 747 (Ramadan 25, 129AH), Abu Muslim successfully initiated an open up revolt against Umayyad rule,^{[13] [57]} which was carried out under the sign of the Blackness Standard.^{[53] [58] [59]} Shut to x,000 soldiers were under Abu Muslim's control when the hostilities officially began in Merv.^[5] On xiv Feb 748 he established control of Merv,^[56] expelling Nasr ibn Sayyar less than a yr after the latter had put down Ibn Surayj'southward revolt, and dispatched an ground forces westwards.^{[53] [58] [60]}

Newly commissioned Abbasid officer Qahtaba ibn Shabib al-Ta'i, along with his sons Al-Hasan ibn Qahtaba and Humayd ibn Qahtaba, pursued Ibn Sayyar to Nishapur and so pushed him farther west to Qumis, in western Iran.^[61] That August, al-Ta'i defeated an Umayyad force of 10,000 at Gorgan. Ibn Sayyar regrouped with reinforcements from the Caliph at Rey, only for that city to fall as well as the Caliph's commander; over again, Ibn Sayyar fled west and died on 9 Dec 748 while trying to achieve Hamedan.^[61] Al-Ta'i rolled due west through Khorasan, defeating a fifty,000 stiff Umayyad force at Isfahan in March 749.

At Nahavand, the Umayyads attempted to brand their last stand in Khorasan. Umayyad forces fleeing Hamedan and the remainder of Ibn Sayyar'south men joined with those already garrisoned.^[61] Qahtaba defeated an Umayyad relief contingent from Syria while his son al-Hasan laid siege to Nahavand for more than two months. The Umayyad military units from Syria within the garrison cut a deal with the Abbasids, saving their own lives past selling out the Umayyad units from Khorasan who were all put to expiry.^[61] Later on almost 90 years, Umayyad rule in Khorasan had finally come to an end.

At the same time that al-Ta'i took Nishapur, Abu Muslim was strengthening the Abbasid grip on the Muslim far east. Abbasid governors were appointed over Transoxiana and Bactria, while the rebels who had signed a peace accord with Nasr ibn Sayyar were too offered a peace deal by Abu Muslim just to exist double crossed and wiped out.^[61] With the pacification of any insubordinate elements in the eastward and the surrender of Nahavand in the west, the Abbasids were the undisputed rulers of Khorasan.

Mesopotamia phase [edit]

The Abbasids wasted no fourth dimension in standing from Khorosan into Mesopotamia. In Baronial 749, Umayyad commander Yazid ibn Umar al-Fazari attempted to meet the forces of al-Ta'i before they could reach Kufa. Not to be outdone, the Abbasids launched a nighttime raid on al-Fazari'south forces before they had a chance to prepare. During the raid, al-Ta'i himself was finally killed in battle. Despite the loss, al-Fazari was routed and fled with his forces to Wasit.^[62] The Siege of Wasit took place from that August until July 750. Although a respected military commander had been lost, a large portion of the Umayyad forces were substantially trapped within Wasit and could be left in their virtual prison while more than offensive military actions were made.^[63]

Concurrently with the siege in 749, the Abbasids crossed the Euphrates and took Kufa.^{[34] [58]} The son of Khalid al-Qasri – a disgraced Umayyad official who had been tortured to expiry a few years prior – began a pro-Abbasid anarchism starting at the city'due south citadel. On 2 September 749, al-Hasan bin Qahtaba essentially only walked right in to the city and gear up store.^[63] Some confusion followed when Abu Salama, an Abbasid officer, pushed for an Alid leader. Abu Muslim's confidante Abu Jahm reported what was happening, and the Abbasids acted preemptively. On Friday, 28 November 749, earlier the siege of Wasit had fifty-fifty finished, As-Saffah, the neat-grandson of Muhammad's uncle, al-Abbas, was recognized every bit the new caliph in the mosque at Kufa.^{[53] [64]} Abu Salama, who witnessed twelve military commanders from the revolution pledging allegiance, was embarrassed into following arrange.^[63]

But equally quickly as Qahtaba'due south forces marched from Khorosan to Kufa, so did the forces of Abdallah ibn Ali and Abu Awn Abd al-Malik ibn Yazid march on Mosul.^[63] At this point Marwan Two mobilized his troops from Harran and avant-garde toward Mesopotamia. On 16 January 750 the 2 forces met on the left bank of a tributary of the Tigris in the Battle of the Zab, and nine days later on Marwan 2 was defeated and his army was completely destroyed.^{[14] [34] [63] [65]} The battle is regarded as what finally sealed the fate of the Umayyads. All Marwan Two could do was abscond through Syria and into Arab republic of egypt, with each Umayyad boondocks surrendering to the Abbasids as they swept through in pursuit.^[63]

Damascus fell to the Abbasids in April, and in August Marwan Two and his family were tracked downwards by a modest forcefulness led past Abu Awn and Salih ibn Ali (the brother of Abdallah ibn Ali) and killed in Egypt.^{[fourteen] [34] [53] [59] [65]} Al-Fazari, the Umayyad commander at Wasit, held out even afterward the defeat of Marwan II in January. The Abbasids promised him amnesty in July, but immediately after he exited the fortress they executed him instead. After almost exactly three years of rebellion, the Umayyad land came to an end.^{[xiii] [22]}

Tactics [edit]

Ethnic equality [edit]

Militarily, the unit organization of the Abbasids was designed with the goal of indigenous and racial equality amidst supporters. When Abu Muslim recruited mixed Arab and Iranian officers forth the Silk Route, he registered them based non on their tribal or ethno-national affiliations but on their current places of residence.^[57] This greatly diminished tribal and ethnic solidarity and replaced both concepts with a sense of shared interests among individuals.^[57]

Propaganda [edit]

The Abbasid Revolution provides an early medieval example of the effectiveness of propaganda. The Black Standard unfurled at the offset of the revolution's open phase carried messianic overtones due to past failed rebellions by members of Muhammad's family, with marked eschatological and millennial slants.^[5] The Abbasids – their leaders descended from Muhammad'south uncle Al-'Abbas ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib – held vivid historical reenactments of the murder of Muhammad's grandson Husayn ibn Ali by the army of the second Umayyad ruler Yazid I, followed by promises of retribution.^[5] Focus was carefully placed on the legacy of Muhammad'southward family while details of how the Abbasids actually intended to rule were not mentioned.^[66] While the Umayyads had primarily spent their free energy on wiping out the Alid line of the prophetic family, the Abbasids carefully revised Muslim chronicles to put a heavier emphasis on the relationship betwixt Muhammad and his uncle.^[66]

The Abbasids spent more than than a yr preparing their propaganda drive against the Umayyads. In that location were a total of 70 propagandists throughout the province of Khorasan, operating under twelve central officials.^[67]

Secrecy [edit]

The Abbasid Revolution was distinguished by a number of tactics which were absent in the other, unsuccessful anti-Umayyad rebellions at the fourth dimension. Chief among them was secrecy. While the Shi'ite and other rebellions at the time were all led by publicly known leaders making clear and well-defined demands, the Abbasids hid not simply their identities but also their preparation and mere existence.^{[51] [68]} Every bit-Saffah would go on to get the commencement Abbasid caliph, but he did not come forward to receive the pledge of allegiance from the people until afterward the Umayyad caliph and a large number of his princes were already killed.^[11]

Abu Muslim al-Khorasani, who was the primary Abbasid military commander, was especially mysterious; fifty-fifty his name, which literally means "father of a Muslim from the big, flat expanse of the eastern Muslim empire" gave no meaningful information about him personally.^[67] Even today, although scholars are sure he was 1 real, consistent individual, there is broad understanding that all physical suggestions of his actual identity are doubtful.^[53] Abu Muslim himself discouraged inquiries nearly his origins, emphasizing that his religion and place of residence were all that mattered.^[67]

Whoever he was, Abu Muslim built a secret network of pro-Abbasid sentiment based among the mixed Arab and Iranian military officers along the Silk Route garrison cities. Through this networking, Abu Muslim ensured armed support for the Abbasids from a multi-ethnic force years earlier the revolution even came out in the open up.^[23] These networks proved essential, every bit the officers garrisoned along the Silk Road had spent years fighting the ferocious Turkic tribes of Primal Asia and were experienced and respected tacticians and warriors.^[threescore]

Backwash [edit]

National borders in the region past 800AD

The victors desecrated the tombs of the Umayyads in Syrian arab republic, sparing only that of Umar II, and well-nigh of the remaining members of the Umayyad family were tracked down and killed.^{[11] [34]} When Abbasids declared amnesty for members of the Umayyad family, eighty gathered in Jaffa to receive pardons and all were massacred.^[69]

In the immediate aftermath, the Abbasids moved to consolidate their ability confronting former allies now seen equally rivals.^[11] Five years after the revolution succeeded, Abu Muslim was accused of heresy and treason by the second Abbasid caliph al-Mansur. Abu Muslim was executed at the palace in 755 despite his reminding al-Mansur that it was he (Abu Muslim) who got the Abbasids into power,^{[18] [22] [60]} and his travel companions were bribed into silence. Displeasure over the caliph'south brutality equally well as admiration for Abu Muslim led to rebellions against the Abbasid Dynasty itself throughout Khorasan and Kurdistan.^{[22] [lxx]}

Although Shi'ites were key to the revolution's success, Abbasid attempts to claim orthodoxy in light of Umayyad fabric excess led to continued persecution of Shi'ites.^{[12] [15]} On the other hand, non-Muslims regained the government posts they had lost nether the Umayyads.^[12] Jews, Nestorian Christians, Zoroastrians and even Buddhists were re-integrated into a more than cosmopolitan empire centered around the new, ethnically and religiously diverse urban center of Baghdad.^{[5] [35] [48]}

The Abbasids were essentially puppets of secular rulers starting from 945,^{[xi] [16]} though their rule over Baghdad and its surroundings continued until 1258 when the Mongols sacked Baghdad, while their lineage as nominal caliphs lasted until 1517, when the Ottomans conquered Egypt (the seat of the Abbasid caliphate after 1258) and claimed the caliphate for themselves.^{[thirteen] [16]} The period of actual, direct rule past the Abbasids lasted almost exactly ii-hundred years.^[71]

I grandson of Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, Abd ar-Rahman I, survived and established a kingdom in Al-Andalus (Moorish Iberia) after five years of travel west.^{[xiii] [14] [34]} Over the course of thirty years, he ousted the ruling Fihrids and resisted Abbasid incursions to establish the Emirate of Córdoba.^{[72] [73]} This is considered an extension of the Umayyad Dynasty, and ruled from Cordoba from 756 until 1031.^{[12] [32]}

Legacy [edit]

The Abbasid Revolution has been of bully involvement to both Western and Muslim historians.^[58] According to Land Academy of New York professor of sociology Saïd Amir Arjomand, analytical interpretations of the revolution are rare, with most discussions simply lining up behind either the Iranic or Arabic interpretation of events.^[four] Frequently, early European historians viewed the disharmonize solely every bit a non-Arab uprising against Arabs. Bernard Lewis, professor emeritus of Most Eastern Studies at Princeton University, points out that while the revolution has often been characterized equally a Farsi victory and Arab defeat, the caliph was still Arab, the linguistic communication of administration was still Arabic and Arab nobility was not forced to requite up its land holdings; rather, the Arabs were just forced to share the fruits of the empire every bit with other races.^[58]

C.W. Previté-Orton argues that the reasons for the decline of the Umayyads was the rapid expansion of Islam. During the Umayyad period, mass conversions brought Iranians, Berbers, Copts, and Assyrians to Islam. These "clients," equally the Arabs referred to them, were often improve educated and more civilised than their Arab masters. The new converts, on the footing of equality of all Muslims, transformed the political mural. Previté-Orton too argues that the feud between the Arabs in Syria and the Arabs in Mesopotamia further weakened the empire.^[74]

The revolution led to the enfranchisement of non-Arab people who had converted to Islam, granting them social and spiritual equality with Arabs.^[75] With social restrictions removed, Islam changed from an Arab ethnic empire to a universal world faith.^[35] This led to a great cultural and scientific exchange known every bit the Islamic Golden Age, with most achievements taking identify nether the Abbasids. What was later known as Islamic culture and civilization was defined by the Abbasids, rather than the earlier Rashidun and Umayyad caliphates.^{[xvi] [35] [48]} New ideas in all areas of club were accepted regardless of their geographic origin, and the emergence of societal institutions that were Islamic rather than Arab began. Though a course of Muslim clergy was absent for the first century of Islam, it was with the Abbasid Revolution and subsequently that the Ulama appeared every bit a force in society, positioning themselves as the arbiters of justice and orthodoxy.^[75]

With the eastward movement of the uppercase from Damascus to Baghdad, the Abbasid Empire eventually took on a distinctly Farsi graphic symbol, as opposed to the Arab grapheme of the Umayyads.^[15] Rulers became increasingly autocratic, at times claiming divine correct in defense of their deportment.^[15]

Conclusion [edit]

An authentic and comprehensive history of the revolution has proven difficult to compile for a number of reasons. There are no gimmicky accounts, and nigh sources were written more than than a century after the revolution.^{[76] [77]} Because most historical sources were written under Abbasid rule, the description of the Umayyads must exist taken with a grain of table salt;^{[76] [78]} such sources describe the Umayyads, at all-time, equally merely placeholders between the Rashidun and Abbasid Caliphates.^[79]

The historiography of the revolution is especially significant due to Abbasid dominance of most early on Muslim historical narratives;^{[77] [80]} it was during their rule that history was established in the Muslim world equally an contained field separate from writing in general.^[81] The initial two-hundred year period when the Abbasids really held de facto power over the Muslim world coincided with the first composition of Muslim history.^[71] Another indicate of annotation is that while the Abbasid Revolution carried religious undertones against the irreligious and most secular Umayyads, a separation of mosque and state occurred under the Abbasids too.^{[ commendation needed ]} Historiographical surveys oft focus on the solidifying of Muslim idea and rites under the Abbasids, with the conflicts betwixt separated classes of rulers and clerics giving rise to the empire's eventual separation of organized religion and politics.^[82]

See too [edit]

• Arab–Byzantine wars
• Muslim conquest of the Maghreb
• Battle of the Corking Zab River

References [edit]

1. ^ "The Abbasids had been aided in their ascent past the Shia, with whom they had a common cause in revolt." Confounding Powers – Chaos and International Society from the Assassins to Al Qaeda, Cambridge University Printing, 2016, page 72.
2. ^ Frye, R. N.; Fisher, William Bayne; Frye, Richard Nelson; Avery, Peter; Boyle, John Andrew; Gershevitch, Ilya; Jackson, Peter (26 June 1975). The Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521200936.
3. ^ Paul Rivlin, Arab Economies in the Twenty-Get-go Century, p. 86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. ISBN 9780521895002
4. ^ ^{a b} Saïd Amir Arjomand, Abd Allah Ibn al-Muqaffa and the Abbasid Revolution. Iranian Studies, vol. 27, Nos. ane–4. London: Routledge, 1994.
5. ^ ^{a b c d eastward} Hala Mundhir Fattah, A Brief History of Iraq, p. 77. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009. ISBN 9780816057672
6. ^ ^{a b c d e} Chiliad. R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate Ad 661–750, p. 105. London: Routledge, 2002. ISBN 9781134550586
7. ^ ^{a b} Peter Stearns, Michael Adas, Stuart Schwartz and Marc Jason Gilbert."The Umayyad Imperium." Taken from World Civilizations:The Global Feel, combined book. 7th ed. Zug: Pearson Education, 2014. ISBN 9780205986309
8. ^ ^{a b c} Patrick Clawson, Eternal Iran, p. 17. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. ISBN one-4039-6276-6
9. ^ ^{a b} Al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, p. 417.
10. ^ Chiliad.R. Hawting, The First Dynasty of Islam, pp. 105 & 113.
11. ^ ^{a b c d east f} The Oxford History of Islam, p. 25. Ed. John Esposito. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. ISBN 9780199880416
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Farther reading [edit]

• Agha, Saleh Said (2003). The Revolution which Toppled the Umayyads: Neither Arab nor ʿAbbāsid. Leiden and Boston: Brill. ISBNxc-04-12994-4.
• Blankinship, Khalid Yahya (1994). The Finish of the Jihâd State: The Reign of Hishām ibn ʻAbd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. ISBN978-0-7914-1827-7.
• Daniel, Elton L. (1979). The Political and Social History of Khurasan under Abbasid Rule, 747–820. Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, Inc. ISBN0-88297-025-9.
• Hourani, Albert, History of the Arab Peoples
• Kennedy, Hugh (2004). The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Nigh E from the 6th to the 11th Century (2d ed.). Harlow: Longman. ISBN978-0-582-40525-7.
• Shaban, 1000. A. (1979). The ʿAbbāsid Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN0-521-29534-3.
• Sharon, Moshe (1990). Revolt: the social and military machine aspects of the ʿAbbāsid revolution. Jerusalem: Graph Press Ltd. ISBN965-223-388-9.

External links [edit]

• Abbasid Calipahte Bibliography at Oxford Bibliographies
• The Rising and Spread of Islam

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasid_Revolution

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